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Abstract
Purpose – This paper shows the accounting, accountability and calculative practices associated with
emergency food allocations by the City of Turin through a program to feed the vulnerable during COVID-19.
Design/methodology/approach – This is a single case study framed by Foucault’s governmentality
concept. The data was collected through interviews with key institutional actors and triangulated against
decrees, circulars, ordinances and other publicly available documents.
Findings –The accounting tools of governmentality are always incomplete. Sometimes unique situations and
crises help us to revise and improve the tools we have. Other times, they demand entirely new tools.
Research limitations/implications – Accounting needs both things to count and a context to count them.
In the case of food assistance, what is counted is people. In Turin’s case, many people had never been counted –
either because there was no need or because they were unaccounted for by choice. Now, the government was
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Originality/value – Although the accounting-for-disasters literature is diverse, studies too often favour the
macro social, economic and political issues surrounding crises, neglecting the micro issues associated with
governmentality and calculative practices.
Keywords COVID-19, Governmentality, Food, Vulnerable population, Accounting, Calculations, Turin Italy
Paper type Research paper
1. Disasters, food, government and accounting
Families with babies, families where both wife and husband worked with an undeclared contract,
like the Philippines community or the Peruvian community, all of them have lost their job because
they work as domestic workers and carers [1].
This paper explores governmental accounting, accountability and calculative practices
through an emergency food assistance program operating in Turin, Italy, during the
COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020. Drawing on interviews and publicly-available documents,
we interpret the data using Foucault’s concept of governmentality, which is “a certain way of
thinking and acting embodied in all those attempts to know and govern the wealth, health
and happiness of populations” (Rose and Miller, 1992, p. 174). The period of study spans 31
January–31 July 2020. During this time, the Italian federal government, the regional
government of Piedmont, and the City of Turin implemented governmentality systems to
manage emergency food assistance programs.
The intersection between accounting and calculative practices in crises is of continuing
interest to accounting researchers. From bushfires (Taylor et al., 2014), droughts (Walker,
2014), floods (Lai et al., 2014; Sciulli, 2018), earthquakes (Sargiacomo et al., 2014;
Sargiacomo, 2015) and hurricanes (Baker, 2014; Perkiss and Moerman, 2020), the
accounting-for-crises literature is varied. However, while these studies contribute to our
understanding of the macro social, economic and political issues surrounding crises, they
are often silent on the micro issues (see Perkiss and Moerman, 2020, p. 11). Additionally,
except for studies on issues concerning the HIV pandemic in Africa (Rahaman et al., 2010),
there is still much to learn about the intersection between accounting and calculative
practices in crises triggered by major public health emergencies, which are becoming more
frequent (Yu, 2021).
We explore emergency food distribution in a crisis as part of the ongoing interrelations
between accounting, food, state, local authorities and social institutions with a specific focus
on how these institutions are involved in the political economy and the regulation, allocation
and distribution of food to people (Sargiacomo et al., 2016). Attention has been to
investigating food allocation pipelines (e.g. MacRae and Abergel, 2012) from an
accountability perspective ever since Dodd’s (1856) The Food of London. However, this
interest has not extended as far as accounting research into disaster and crises to date. The
COVID-19 pandemic provides a contemporary context for putting the accounting and
calculative practices associated with emergency food assistance under the microscope. More
specifically, it is an opportunity to investigate how governmentality practices develop to
ensure food reaches those in need during a crisis.
Governmentality studies are a way to investigate accounting and calculative practices. For
example, Sargiacomo (2015) draws on the main principles of Foucault’s (1991) “art of
government” to underpin his study of managing the aftermath of Italy’s 2009 earthquake. He
highlights that governmentality studies are useful because they “emphasise how accounting
helps to facilitate normal governance, [. . . when] things do not always proceed according to
plan” and,morepointedly, that “unexpected events require departures from the ’normal’” (p. 84).
First, we reveal the relationship between accounting, calculative practices,




work in tandem with social institutions. Second, we contribute to the governmentality
literature with a case on the intersections between accounting and emergency food
assistance to city populations during a pandemic. Thus, our case study contributes to an
understanding of how governance and accounting practices during a crisis might help save
people’s lives.
2. Methods
Before COVID-19, one of the authors was already working on a research project into how
charities assist the poor. This research meant we had already undertaken interviews and
collected some documents about food assistance, NGOs and Turin’s distribution processes.
Before COVID-19, national, regional and local government laws prescribed the rules for
distributing food activities and roles. This prior research enabled us to identify critical
institutional and individual actors to inform our research immediately after Italy declared a
State of emergency in January 2020. We analysed over 40 documents, including national,
regional and local government decrees, debates, circulars and ordinances – plus more than
20 h of video footage of Turin City Council meetings and local committees. Figure 1 illustrates
the period of analysis beginning 1 January 2020, through to the lockdown from 9March to 18
May, and ending on 31 July.
Table 1 provides a list detailing the semi-structured interviews conducted before COVID
and from April to June 2020. The interviewees we highlight in Table 1 provide data for
identifying our meta themes that identify the apparatus and the technologies adopted for
allocating food assistance activities. During the interviews, one author made written notes. In
some instances, we conducted follow-up interviews with questions and written responses via
telephone and email.
Figure 1.








From this corpus, we identified newmeta-themes explicitly relating to food distribution in the
pandemic. We also triangulated common elements (convergence) and discovered
complementary elements (extension of the previous knowledge) (Grafton et al., 2011).
3. Governing populations during epidemics
Foucault (1991, p. 189) states that “for half a century after the great cholera epidemic of 1832,
Europeans were obsessed by fears of epidemic disease”. In a subsequent paper, how each
province “had to take care of public health, diseases, epidemics and accidents . . ., and it had to
manage a kind of insurance for people to be protected against all such accidents” (1994,
p. 411). Later still, he explains how, historically, the challenge of governing “population was
posed in relation . . . to major human catastrophes” (2007, p. 67). Prior accounting studies on
governmentality have already provided insights on healthcare (Sargiacomo, 2015) and
evacuee-housing following an earthquake (Sargiacomo and Walker, 2021). However,
researchers have yet to explore the governance of populations “after a great disaster, be it
an epidemic . . . or food shortage” (Foucault, 2007, p. 61).
Rose and Miller (1992, p. 175) argue that academia has a responsibility alongside the
fourth and fifth estates to frame political issues and make visible how governments are
exercising their power:
The problematics of government should also be analysed in terms of their governmental
technologies, the complex of mundane programmes, calculations, techniques, apparatuses,
Interviewee Day Location Duration Focus
Before
COVID
Director of Sermig [one
of the hubs during the
emergency]
12.03.2019 Main office 2h The management of food
solidarity programmes from
traditional welfare to social
innovationDirector of Caritas
[involved during the
emergency in the hubs
work]
02.04.2019 Main office 2h
Director of Cottolengo







Manager of Food Pride
Network [involved
during the emergency
in the hubs work]









the state of emergency
declaration
Project Manager of the
Local Community
Center Casa del
Quartiere (one of the
hubs)
17.06.2020 Virtual 1h Food hubs daily operations
Vice-Mayor of the City
of Turin
17.06.2020 Virtual 1h The design of Torino Solidale
Network and its management
Director of the Social
Policy Department
18.06.2020 Virtual 1h Operational profiles and
accountability implications
Table 1.




documents and procedures through which authorities seek to embody and give effect to
governmental ambitions.
Drawing on the case provided by “the town, scarcity and the epidemic” (Foucault, 2007, p. 63),
and starting from the assumption that “government is the right disposition of things
arranged so as to lead to a convenient end” (Foucault, 1991, p. 93), we analyse how a city
government used accounting technologies, calculations and lists to allocate and distribute
food to the poor and a broader group of the vulnerable during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Lists of people sit at the heart of this case – lists of the elderly, lists of the disabled, the poor
and food insecure, those in strict isolation and quarantine, old lists, new lists, and people who
should be on lists but are not. Homogenous social lists are a standard part of charities’
calculative practices that help the poor and needy (Walker, 2004; Servalli, 2013). They are also
a standard tool for supporting governmentality programs, for instance, to assist evacuees in
the aftermath of natural disasters (Sargiacomo and Walker, 2021, p. 15). Bowker and Star
(1999, p. 138) highlight that “when lists are used to coordinate important work that is
distributed widely over time and space, a corresponding complex organisational structure
and infrastructure evolves”. Infrastructure may evolve during “the regulations for times of
epidemic” when we observe “measures taken in plague towns, and the quarantines enforced
. . .all constituted forms of authoritarian medicalisation” (Foucault, 1994, p. 92).
4. Governance, accounting and calculative practices for distributing food to the
vulnerable
4.1 The pre-COVID state in Turin
Turin is in north-eastern Italy. It is the fourth most populated Italian city with less than 1m
citizens and home to the fourth-largest concentration of immigrants (15%) (Centro Einaudi,
2019). Turin has been described as “two cities in one” because 30% of its population has
considerable financial means, while the other 70% fall near or below the poverty line (Centro
Einaudi, 2019). Of its population, almost 25% are over 65, and 40% have an annual income of
less thanV15,000, which, by law, is the average family income threshold needed to apply for
essential social service relief (see Table 2).
Among these statistics used to count the vulnerable before COVID, none pertain to food
distribution. Private initiatives led by NGOs largely fulfilled this function, sometimes in
collaboration with the city, sometimes not.
Notably, since 2015, Turin was among the first Italian cities to sign the Milan Food Pact
[2]. The pact stipulates that Mayors are responsible for providing “cash and food transfers,
and other forms of social protection systems (food banks, community food kitchens,
emergency food pantries)” to vulnerable people.
Consequently, the City of Turin amended one of its statutes to reflect this responsibility
[3], i.e.:
To promote the implementation of the right to adequate food, as the right to have regular, permanent
and free access to quality food, sufficient, nutritious, healthy, culturally and religiously acceptable,
which guarantees mental and physical satisfaction, for the individual and the population, necessary
to lead a worthy life.
In 2018, Turin established a Social Inclusion Plan involving 110 NGOs and associations to
serve as a repository of co-designed projects and a collector of any public or private financial
funds to be spent on local welfare. Initiatives to feed the poor, such as soup kitchensmanaged
by local NGOs (13 in total in 2020).
As such, operational control of all food deliveries pre-COVID remainedwith the NGOs, and
the City did not design its lists to track those affected by food shortages. Therefore, when the





“vulnerable populations”, such as COVID-positive individuals subject to home recovery or
precautionary quarantine and people who had lost their jobs. Others were lists of invisible
people who needed to become visible, e.g. illegal immigrants and undocumented workers.
4.2 Distributing emergency food assistance to a growing vulnerable population
On 3 February 2020, the Minister of the Interior released the first ordinance to tackle the
COVID-19 pandemic (OCCPD no. 630). The ordinance defined responsibilities for various
government levels and established an expense chapter with the Civil Protection
Department (CPD) to face COVID-19 and prevent it from spreading. A few weeks later,
each region, including Piedmont, was required to create a unique COVID-19 accounting
centre (OCCPD n. 639, 25 February 2020). Three days later, Turin set up a Local
Government Operations Centre to help its 900,000-strong population face an imminent
nationwide lockdown (which ended on 9 March 2020). The Centre managed
communications, the media, and the flood of calls coming in on an emergency hotline.
Food management during the emergency was placed “under the direct control of the City of
Turin” (Regional Council Member, Interview). This control meant collaborating with a
central Food Bank as a buyer of processed food and a collector of fresh food surplus from
List Number Source Date
Inhabitants 875,698 Popular Financial
Reporting
Dec 19
Elderly (>70 years) 176,290 Social Inclusion
Plan
Nov 19
Legal immigrants 123,380 ISTAT and
Rapporto Rota
Dec 18
Indirectly assisted by social services 71,519
(1) 14,285 families with babies
(incl foster care)
(2) 13,961 disabled
(3) 17,972 elderly living alone
(4) 13,015 adults with specific
needs*





Directly assisted by social services in
the City of Turin in 2018
7,510
(1) 1,437 minors






Homeless 1,800 (estimated) Popular Financial
Reporting
Dec 18
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the local agri-food centres. It also involved working with the Bank of the Charity Works
(Banco delle Opere di Carita) to ensure that staff could complete emergency deliveries while
still complying with social distancing guidelines.
By March, only 5 of the city’s 13 soup kitchens remained open due to social distancing
rules and the demographics of the workers and patrons who frequent food shelters. As the
Vice-Mayor of Turin explains, “Most of the volunteers working with our local associations
and NGOs are retired, the most in danger during the pandemic, and this has affected the
possibility of providing the same quality level of the food services” (Interview, 18 June 2020).
As more retail food stores closed and the quantity of surplus food collected declined in both
quality and quantity, those relying on the soup kitchens began to protest. In response, the
Food Bank began to order fresh food from the local markets instead.
4.3 The Torino Solidale network
Toward the end of March, a local government directive formed Torino Solidale, a network of
12 emergency food and essential supply hubs throughout the city for the needy and
households without local support. The City of Turin managed the network alongside third-
sector organisations chosen from those already participating in the Social Inclusion Plan.
Turin’s NGO network was already using some hubs to feed the poor before the pandemic, so
Torino Solidale expanded from the existing infrastructure. Foucault (1988, p. 142) would
describe this as an “upgrade to government technology” that required a “new mapping and
the closer surveillance of the urban space”. Figure 2 illustrates a map of the community
centres in the most deprived areas and the logistics centres used to distribute the food to the
12 hubs.
During the state of emergency, feeding the poor turned into feeding the new poor. Thus, a
larger, more diverse group of people labelled “the vulnerable”, amalgamated from various
purpose-built lists of citizens, each requiring their own urgent, yet tailored-made, government
solution emerged. For example, one list comprised the elderly, the infected, and the
quarantined, who were all subject to “authoritarian medicalisation” (Foucault, 1994, p. 92) in
that they had financial resources but were not allowed to go shopping. Thus, to those on this
list, CPD offered a paid food delivery service.
A second list was of those facing extreme financial difficulty, whether entrenched or for
the first time. For these new poor, the city-funded a web portal where people could apply for
food e-vouchers and, later, for food baskets. People could also register for assistance through
a mobile app, by phone or in person. The most impoverished people were usually registered
both by local government officers and a network of volunteers to ensure they received food
assistance. A Torino Solidale representative interviewed each applicant before being
included on the list. During the interviews, narrative accounts of their situation were a critical
factor in approving the applications than other quantitative criteria.
4.4 The fund for food solidarity
At the same time, Turin was organising its emergency food distribution plans, and the federal
government was organising theirs (OCCPD no. 658). On 29 March, just five days after Torino
Solidale commenced operations, the Italian government announced V400m in support for the
Fund for Food Solidarity to be proportionally distributed between the municipalities using
financial and non-financial criteria. The CPD performed the calculations and funding
allocations in keepingwith the relevant bookkeeping and accounting guidelines in tandemwith
ANCI (the Italian association of municipalities). These calculations provided the inscriptions
about how the cities would receive and spend public money to organise food assistance.
Specifically, 80% of the money was allocated based on population, with the remaining





Subsequently, “the mayors of the largest cities, [. . .] started working on the subsequent
elaboration of an implementation guideline to help them manage distributing funds”
(Regional Council Member, Interview). However, as there are no official counts of homeless
people for any city, these people were not on the central government’s lists and, therefore, not
factored into this temporary relief program calculations.
Turin received aroundV4.6m of the totalV400m budget and added anotherV663,000 of
its funding to support the program’s activities in the local area. The funds were apportioned
as follows: V4.29m on food vouchers; V120,000 on prepared meals for home delivery, the
“Educate” coop
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Food Bank
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Source(s): Elaboration of the authors on data collected during the interviews and other secondary
sources
Figure 2.







homeless and immigrants; and V880,000 to Torino Solidale to buy and distribute food
baskets. Deciding how to apportion the money was a complicated process, as was how to
distribute the vouchers, meals and baskets equitably. For example, to qualify for food
vouchers, applicants had to declare that they were suffering financial distress caused by the
pandemic; and no-one in the family was benefitting from another public subsidy. Only one
family member could request the food vouchers and the dollar amount depended on the
number of people in family (1–2 5 V300; 3–4 5 V400; ≥5 5 V500). Table 3 outlines the
income and expenditure of these funds from January through July.
As part of the approval process, officials cross-checked applicants against social services
lists to ensure no-one received double support. But Turin decided to “not apply any criteria
linked to income during the emergency, and all the controls would be performed ex-post, to
guarantee an expedited action for the vulnerable people” (Turin Vice-Mayor, Interview, 18
June 2020). Also, the web portal listed 150 accredited local shops where recipients could
redeem their vouchers. A cloud platform tracked where the vouchers had been redeemed,
including the distance between the voucher holder’s residence and the shop. This system
reflects a “buyer-supplier” governmental technology that connects assisted populations to
suitable local suppliers. Other items tracked were daily redemptions, family composition and
the type of entitlement. The tracking provided some accountability over the funds. For
example, the city constructed maps reporting voucher use concentrations across Turin’s
districts. As one City Councillor stated:
The portal opened in theweek from 6April to 10April. Once the newswas released, we receivedmore
than 1,000 calls per hour. On 6 April, we distributed nearlyV1m,V1.38m the second day,V1.2m the
third day and nearly V0.6m the fourth and fifth day, and we went rapidly over budget during the
weekend. We distributed vouchers to 12,752 families in four days [. . .], and there was not a
Date
Commitment of
expenditure Funding source Income V
Expenditure
V
29 Mar 20 Civil Protection OCCPD no. 658 4,624,012.40
02 Apr 20 1,063 Purchase electronic food vouchers 1,000,000.00
03 Apr 20 1,071 Purchase electronic food vouchers 2,624,012.40
06 Apr 20 1,083 City of Turin reserves 663,000.00
06 Apr 20 1,083 Purchase electronic food vouchers 663,000.00
22 Apr 20 1,265 Soup kitchen meals 60,0000.00
05 May 20 1,491 Transfer to Damamar for food baskets 800,000.00
27 May20 Fund for Food Solidarity (donations) *212,225.08
04 Jun 20 1,666 Web portal to manage food voucher
delivery (EU Funded)
99,201.78 99,201.78
15 Jun 20 Piedmont Region donation *250,000.00
15 Jun 20 Turin Chamber of Commerce donation *200,000.00
08 Jul 20 2,160 Web portal to manage food basket
delivery (EU Funded)
40,326.00 40,326.00
09 Jul 20 2,182 Cooked meals provided by social
services (fundedwith internal resources)
120,000.00 120,000.00






Note(s): *not already allocated to any specific purpose ready to be spent
¤financed with internal resources










concentration of shops, but an equal distribution across the territory: 15% in small shops, 60% in
local supermarkets and only 25% in larger supermarkets.
By 9 April, Turin had spent the budget allocated to food vouchers, and there were still 7,928
unfulfilled applications. Hence, the list of assumed vulnerable people was much longer than
initially thought. On the same day, the city announced that these unlucky applicants could
instead apply for a food basket through the web platform. As a result of this plan B strategy
by the city and NGOs, 4,000 more families received home-delivered food baskets (Minutes of
the City Council of 27 April).
Plan B emerged on day one of the voucher program when the overwhelming numbers of
vulnerable people became apparent. That afternoon, the Food Bank, DamamarNGO, and the
Bank of Charity Works signed an MoU to boost the collection and distribution of free and
surplus food as food baskets. However, the type of food basket and its quality soon became an
issue. In part, this was because the kinds of people requesting food during the pandemic did
not necessarily fit the standard mould of people the charities typically helped. Traditionally,
food assistance meant providing a high calorie, high protein meal. However:
A family with a baby needs other types of food because usually, a food pack has 1 kg of rice, 400 gr of
beans, and one can of tuna and tomato sauce that can last for one week only. (City Council Minutes,
27 April)
4.5 Accountability and reporting practices
Meeting the conditions stipulated by the emergency food directive, the Italian government
asked cities to open a new accounting ledger entitled the Urgent food solidarity measure.
Accordingly, the cities used the same account to collect other public and private donations
to assist with the emergency. By so doing, utterly novel government technologies
were implemented, including “techniques of notation, computation and calculation” (Rose
and Miller, 1992, p. 183). On 6 April, the City of Turin opened its first “food solidarity”
account.
We find evidence of specific accounting for emergency relief by the CPD within their
reporting infrastructure. For instance, on 23 May, they asked all municipalities, including
Turin, to complete and forward a new multi-table report in Excel to accounting for the funds
and how they spent them.
One of the compulsory reports, “Home assistance”, required an accounting of the expenses
incurred for the food’s cost and delivered for the vulnerable (period 31.01.2020–31.05.2020).
Another, “Hotel assistance”, asked for expenses sustained for the allocation of meals.
Another example is Turin’s compliance with L.G.D. No. 986, when the city reported a
variation of the financial forecast and budget for 2020/2022 to include other donations
received from other public and private institutions (Table 3). Turin accounted for the money
using two additional sub-accounts. One was for purchasing food by transferring funds to
Damamar NGO. Torino Solidale and the management network used the second account for
transactions made in providing emergency food relief.
However, while the accounting and accountability practices over the use of emergency
funds appear to be adequate, there was no accountability or counting of Turin’s invisible
denizens, i.e. its 1,200 illegal immigrants and undeclared workers (Hajer and Ambrosini,
2020). Nor was there any accounting for those who did not receive assistance by Torino
Solidale. However, Torino Solidale implemented several operating controls. First,
operators tried to discourage any opportunistic behaviours by talking to the applicants
by phone or face-to-face meetings. Second, the shared database allowed all the hub
managers to perform a real-time check of any other support issued to a family member.





During the first wave of COVID-19, roughly 10,000 families received a monthly food
basket. Subsequent interviews were conducted personally by Torino Solidale operators to
ensure each family’s continued emergency status and, in turn, their entitlement to support.
Nearly 1,500 families were declared to be past crisis point (Minutes of the Social Policy
Committee of 4 June 2020). The intention was for Torino Solidale to be transformed from
an emergency measure to a permanent public policy after the first pandemic wave with
monthly support to a vulnerable population (Interview with the Vice Mayor of the City of 18
June 2020).
5. Discussions and conclusions
In a scenario characterised by “regulations for times of epidemic . . .measures taken in plague
towns, and the quarantines enforced . . .” (Foucault, 1994, p. 92), our analysis of the response
to the epidemic in Turin fills a gap in governmentality studies on crises concerning the
intersections between accounting and towns, food shortages and epidemics (Foucault, 2007,
p. 63). Prior studies on crises havemostly offered investigations of themacro social, economic
and political issues surrounding bushfires (Taylor et al., 2014), floods (Lai et al., 2014) or
earthquakes (Sargiacomo et al., 2014; Sargiacomo, 2015). The unveiling in our case study of
micro-accounting techniques and technologies deployed at the local government level
permits a better understanding of the micro issues related to specific population’s segments
(see Perkiss and Moerman, 2020, p. 11).
The list of technologies called into action, in this case, was extensive, confirming that
“government is the right disposition of things arranged to lead to a convenient end”
(Foucault, 1991, p. 93). Indeed, there is no doubt that the classification of space and society is
pivotal to governmentality during a pandemic. The government was required to launch new
tools and technologies, such as the Torino Solidale network. This apparatus established well-
dispersed food hubs by expanding an already-existing infrastructure. The government used
its relational capital with local actors and designed a map based on the town cartography
after identifying its constituents’ needs across the territory. Our study complements and
extends prior literature by adding novel pieces of evidence in a case where a metropolis is
facing a severe pandemic and a population either cannot get to or cannot afford to buy food
despite its abundance.
In our case, what emerged is an example of how the government is “a science of endless lists
and classifications” (Bowker and Star, 1999, p. 16). During Turin’s handling of the emergency
food assistance program, list-making was of paramount importance as a government
technology for “coordinating activity distributed in time and space” (Bowker and Star, 1999,
p. 138). Before the pandemic, there were already numbers and lists of the poor. The city had to
extend its previous knowledge by creating purpose-built lists, such as the elderly not yet
assisted, the disabledwhohavedifficultieswith shopping, the infectedwhomust not be allowed
to leave their house, the parents with babies who lost their job, and so on. One of the most
challenging tasks was tracking the people who would prefer to be uncounted, such as illegal
immigrants and undocumented workers, in any other circumstance. Concerned by legal
matters, the presumption was that manywould not apply for emergency food. The City helped
these citizens by providing cooked meals at immigrant centres where visitors could remain
anonymous. However, this issue is broad enough and intriguing enough to warrant further
research. Unfortunately, for the time being, these individuals remain invisible.
Expanding the governmentality literature on “social lists”, one final amalgamated list of
“the vulnerable” emerged for Turin to encompass the myriad human situations alluded to
above (Foucault, 1994, p. 92). That list identified people as a heterogenous “distribution of
cases in a population circumscribed in time or space” (Foucault, 2007, p. 60). Classifications





money calculated for food-vouchers linked to the number of people in families seeking
assistance became “integral to any working infrastructure”. They served “the needs
of multiple local, national and international information systems” (Bowker and Star, 1999,
p. 16).
Turin also made extensive use of accounting and “techniques of notation, computation
and calculation” (Rose and Miller, 1992, p. 183) as government technologies. At the national
level, in the aftermath of Italy’s declaration of a state of emergency, the CPD’s COVID-19
expense ledger and Piedmont’s unique accounting system (OCCPD n. 639) represented the
first act of the launch of novel accounting technologies of government and the inscription of
calculative practices. The national Fund for Food Solidarity program, established in March,
was distributed using a formula at the regional level and executed at a micro-territorial level.
These new forms of data collection, inscription, accounting, and calculative practices were
pivotal in administering food deliveries to a diverse population. Thus, purpose-built specific
guidelines and technical notes were distributed to local governments, showing both the way
to get public money and the new ledger’ urgent food solidarity measure’ and portraying the
way to use the destined public money. The City of Turin followed the new guidelines and then
undertook a range of food assistance solutions, including the supply of food vouchers, food-
baskets, and cooked meals. The procedures used to account for the food distribution
resonates with Rose and Miller (1992, p. 183), who stressed that government technologies
might also include “the standardisation of systems for training, and the inculcation of new
habits” as found in these new measures.
Additionally, “procedures of examination and assessment, the invention of
. . .presentational forms such as tables” Rose and Miller (1992, p. 183) appeared as well as
technologies that involved both reporting and control practices. For example, the novel and
purpose-builtmulti-table compulsory reporting required to document the funding used for food
assistance to population did not exist before the pandemic. Further, by triangulating data from
theCity ofTurinweb-portal, the government exerted control over publicmoney flows, directing
them toward food vouchers and baskets. Importantly, opportunities for control were available
both top-down and horizontally. For example, anyFoodHub could impose real-time controls on
people by ascertaining whether they had already received assistance from another hub.
Foucault (2007) defines these as space-time controls on territory and population.
In our case, the classification systems emerged, as did organisational and accounting
solutions, which “hold a memory of work that has been done (laboratory, organisational,
epidemiological, sociological) and so permit the recommendation of a reasonable due process
for future work” as affirmed by Bowker and Star (1999, p. 252). These classification systems
illuminate new practices from the Italian experience that may inform how responses to
pandemics and other crises could be adopted or adapted in different settings (Parker and
Northcott, 2016). More importantly, this case shows how governmentality can govern the
wealth, health, and happiness of populations with all its good intentions. However, if that
population is invisible, there is no accountability for their wealth, health and happiness. Thus,
the concept of governmentality needs to expand to consider both the visible and the invisible
to ensure accountability to the entire population. Moreover, governmentality should not only
apply to government spending, it should also apply to NGOs.
Through this case study, we find that meticulous attention to something as minor as food
distribution to vulnerable population confirms that “managing the population does not mean
justmanaging the collectivemass of phenomena ormanaging them simply at the level of their
overall results;managing the population means managing it in depth, in all its fine points and
details” (emphasis added) (Foucault, 2007, p. 107). These fine points and details are the most
important because these fine points are real people.
In these crises, it is the people that matter because if we exclude someone from a list, there




conditions chose not to be on lists because of their situations. Many of these are the thousands
of illegal immigrants who would also have lost their income and access to food (Hajer and
Ambrosini, 2020). Even if they did want to join the list, they are unlikely to have the same
access to the Internet or a mobile phone or landline or even apply in person as would others.
So, they miss out on being included in new lists and miss out on any potential emergency
assistance – then, now and probably into the future.
What we can especially learn from this case is that the accounting tools of governmentality
are always incomplete. Sometimes unique situations and crises help us to revise and improve
the tools we have. Other times, they demand entirely new tools. We must remember that
accounting needs both things to count and a context in which to count them and that some
people are unaccounted for by choice. When a new context arises that fundamentally changes
those preferences, governments must work harder to fulfil their welfare obligations because
accounting for the unaccounted in a pandemic is a matter of life and death.
Notes
1. A member of the Turin Regional Council commenting on new additions to Turin’s vulnerable (25
May, 2020).
2. Milan Urban Food Policy Pact (2015).
3. See art. 2, Statute, City of Turin, 2016.
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